Glenn Wilson

For a number of weeks professional economists and experts of banking crises have been arguing that the proper way to resolve a banking crisis is not to buy toxic assets but rather to recapitalize banks directly via injections of public capital (in the form of preferred shares) into distressed but solvent financial institutions. We criticized the TARP legislation just passed by Congress for not allowing for such a recapitalization of banks via public capital (an approach that has been instead now taken by the UK with its $87 bn bank rescue package and even Belgium/Netherlands in the case of the rescue of Fortis).

So how come that "to inject capital into financial institutions" was the first item that Hank Paulson listed as his priority in his press conference yesterday, thus suggesting that now the US, like the UK, will undertake a partial nationalization of its distressed banks?

The reality is that the TARP legislation passed by Congress (formally the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act) does not in any explicit way allow for such recapitalization of banks via injection of public capital. The US Treasury has initially resisted including explicitly such authority in the Act for several reasons: the banking industry that helped drafting the legislation was against it; there was ideological resistance to the idea of the government taking equity – however preferred – in financial institutions; there was concern that being explicit about public recap of banks would lead to banks’ resistance to participate in the toxic asset purchase program. That is why the Treasury formally resisted putting any explicit wording of public recapitalization of banks into the legislation.
How authorization to recapitalize banks via public capital injections (“partial nationalization”) was introduced - indirectly through the back door - into the TARP legislation

But Congress went ahead and forced on Paulson a provision that said he had to get equity or senior debt from financial institutions in exchange for taking significant assets off their hands--effectively enabling backdoor recapitalizations. Yesterday Ben Bernanke hinted that a change in emphasis might be in the offing for the TARP. And today Paulson seemed to confirm it.

None of the people asking questions at the press conference really seemed to pick up on this, of course (&%%$# Washington journalists!). Along with Paulson's affirmation that the FDIC was going to use its "systemic risk" powers to protect depositors and unsecured creditors "as appropriate," I take it as one more sign that we're headed toward a Swedish solution of our banking crisis—recapitalization and temporary nationalization of much of the banking system. This is the right thing to do, I think. But I'm still a little bit confused as to why Paulson had to back into this instead of asking for it in the first place. Maybe because he thought President Bush would never sign a bill to nationalize the banks? Just a thought.

Treasury prepares for a TARP-and-switch. And it's a good thing, too

Labels: economy